Autonomni brodovi : Snalaženje u okvirima tradicionalnog pomorskog prava by Damilola Osinuga
75
UNMANNED SHIPS: COPING IN THE MURKY 
WATERS OF TRADITIONAL MARITIME LAW
DAMILOLA OSINUGA, LLM* UDK 629.5:347.79
 656.61:347.79
 DOI 10.21857/y26kec4qd9
 Review article 
 Received: 13/1/2020   
 Accepted for print: 23/9/2020
Technological development is advancing more rapidly than regulatory regi-
mes. The adaptability of regulatory regimes and integration with technological 
advances are hindered by cumbersome legislative and bureaucratic processes. The 
wind of change which technology brings to the world has blown through the mari-
time industry as with many other industries. This article seeks to discuss the areas 
of maritime law which will be affected by the introduction of unmanned vessels 
and will consider ways to sidestep or deal with potential quagmires in the light of 
this inevitable technological development.
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1. INT RODUCTION
In a fast-paced world where technology has become part of our day-to-day 
life, the evolution of technology and its impact on modern life is quite immense. 
Technology continues to advance in all industries, from healthcare to educa-
tion. The introduction of technology in a particular industry may either be an 
improvement to existing technologies, i.e., “sustaining technologies“, or a tech-
nology that displaces an established technology and shakes up the industry, a 
ground breaking product that creates a completely new industry, i.e. “disrup-
tive technology“.1 Recently, the wind of disruption has been blowing through all 
industries, and the maritime industry is no exception.
*     Damilola Osinuga, LLM, doctoral researcher, World Maritime University, Fiskehamns-
gatan 1, 211 18 Malmö, Sweden, e-mail: damioshi@gmail.com.
1  Christensen, Clayton M., The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms 
to Fail (The Management of Innovation and Change Series), 1st edn, Perseus Book LLC 
(Ingram), (2013).
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Unmanned ships can be said to be the most disruptive twentieth-century devel-
opment in the maritime industry since the invention of the diesel engine. The inven-
tion of automated vessels is capable of bringing a change to the entire landscape of 
shipping and its business model. It can also affect the role of shipping in society. 
These new, conceptually different vessels have started to appear thanks to their 
systems driven by Artificial Intelligence.2 Although the application of autonomous 
technology is not entirely new to the maritime industry given the use of unmanned 
underwater vehicles, recently there have been rapid advances in the development 
and use of unmanned autonomous and semiautonomous technology.
Unmanned ships are vessels capable of controlled movement on the sea and 
inland waters in the absence of onboard crew.3 Broadly speaking, unmanned 
ships can generically be divided into two types. The first is the remote ship 
where the system is controlled by the use of remote control and a shore-based 
remote operator who uses a computer and joystick to operate the unmanned 
ship’s movement while using radio and satellite communications. The second 
type includes ships enabled by autonomous operating systems that will no long-
er depend on any form of human control but will rather operate at the same 
level as humans.4
However, organisations have gone further to identify different levels of au-
tonomy. The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) has identified four degrees of autonomy: 5
•	 Degree one: A ship with automated processes and decision support: 
seafarers are on board to operate and control shipboard systems and func-
tions. Some operations may be automated and at times be unsupervised but 
with seafarers on board ready to take control.
2 The concept of unmanned vessels was conceived in the early 1970s. In 1973, in his book 
Ships and Shipping of Tomorrow, Rolf Schӧnknecht described the ships of the future where 
a captain would be able to perform his duties in an office building somewhere onshore, 
while the ship would navigate itself with onboard computers. See Andrews, Crispin, Ro-
bot Ships and Unmanned Autonomous Boats, (2016), https://eandt.theiet.org/content/ar-
ticles/2016/09/robot-ships/, (accessed on 10 March 2019).
3 CMI IWG. CMI International Working Group Position Paper on Unmanned Ships and the 
International Regulatory Framework, 2018, https://comitemaritime.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/05/CMI-Position-Paper-on-Unmanned-Ships.pdf, (accessed on 10 June 2020). 
4 Hopster, Gerald; Kołacz, Marta K., When Technology Takes the Wheel – Is the CMR Ready 
to Meet the Demand for Autonomous Transportation?, (2017) 9(1-2) European Journal of 
Commercial Contract Law, 41, https://repub.eur.nl/pub/106767, (accessed on 3 March 2019). 
5 IMO, Autonomous Shipping, 2019, http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pag-
es/Autonomous-shipping.aspx, (accessed on 3 June 2020).
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•	 Degree two: A remotely controlled ship with seafarers on board: the 
ship is controlled and operated from another location. Seafarers are available 
on board to take control and to operate the shipboard systems and functions.
•	 Degree three: A remotely controlled ship without seafarers on board: 
the ship is controlled and operated from another location. 
•	 Degree four: A fully autonomous ship: the operating system of the ship 
is able to make decisions and determine actions itself.
Similarly, the Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) UK Code of 
Practice recognises six (6) levels of vessel autonomy referring to levels of control 
as listed in Table 1 below.6
Level Name Description
0 Manned Vessel/craft is controlled by operators aboard
1 Operated Under Operated control all cognitive functionality is 
controlled by the human operator. The operator has direct 
contact with the Unmanned Vessel over e.g., continuous 
radio (R/C) and/or cable (e.g., tethered UUVs and ROVs). 
The operator makes all decisions, directs and controls all 
vehicle and mission functions.
2 Directed Under Directed control some degree of reasoning and 
ability to respond is implemented into the Unmanned 
Vessel. It may sense the environment, report its state 
and suggest one or several actions. It may also suggest 
possible actions to the operator, such as e.g. prompting 
the operator for information or decisions. However, the 
authority to make decisions is with the operator. The 
Unmanned Vessel will act only if commanded and/or 
permitted to do so.
3 Delegated The Unmanned Vessel is now authorised to execute some 
functions. It may sense environment, report its state and 
define actions and report its intention. The operator has 
the option to object to (veto) intentions declared by the 
Unmanned Vessel during a certain time, after which the 
Unmanned Vessel will act. The initiative emanates from 
the Unmanned Vessel and decision-making is shared 
between the operator and the Unmanned Vessel.
6 Table reproduced from Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships – UK Code of Practice. Avail-
able online: https://www.maritimeuk.org/media-centre/publications/maritime-autono-
mous-surface-ships-uk-code-practice/, (accessed on 30 May 2020).
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4 Monitored The Unmanned Vessel will sense environment and report 
its state. The Unmanned Vessel defines actions, decides, 
acts and reports its action. The operator may monitor the 
events.
5 Autonomous The Unmanned Vessel will sense environment, define 
possible actions, decide and act. The Unmanned Vessel 
is afforded a maximum degree of independence and self-
determination within the context of the system capabilities 
and limitations. Autonomous functions are invoked by 
the on-board systems at occasions decided by the same, 
without notifying any external units or operators.
 
There are also other organisations that have classified the different degrees 
of autonomy in unmanned vessels. Examples are the MASS Levels of Control 
according to the DNV GL class guideline for autonomous and remotely oper-
ated ships, and the MASS Level of Control Definitions according to the Lloyd’s 
Register guidance document on autonomous ships.
With the world’s first fully electric and autonomous container ship,7 with 
zero emissions set to sail in 2020,8 unmanned vessels will inevitably be a reality 
in our world. 
For the purposes of this paper, “unmanned vessels“ refers to both “remote 
controlled vessels“ and “autonomous vessels“.
2. A NEW DAW N FOR MARITIME STAKEHOLDERS?
Advocates of unmanned vessels have enumerated many benefits that will 
accrue to the maritime industry and the environment at large.
The lack of human presence on a vessel provides a large number of ben-
efits to shipowners. Shipowners would benefit from crew wage savings and the 
lack of workplace injuries and claims by crew. Maritime Unmanned Navigation 
through Intelligence in Networks (MUNIN) performed a cost-benefit analysis 
7 The Yara Birkeland will be the world’s first fully electric and autonomous container ship, 
with zero emissions. KONGSBERG is responsible for the development and delivery of 
all key enabling technologies, including the sensors and integration required for remote 
and autonomous ship operations, in addition to the electric drive, battery and propulsion 
control systems.
8 She will be operated by an onboard crew in 2020 while the autonomous systems are being 
tested and certified as safe. By 2022 she is expected to be ready to load cargo and navigate 
autonomously without onboard crew.
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on the commercial viability of unmanned merchant shipping, compared to a 
conventional bulker as a reference point. It was noted that the largest cost sav-
ings are due to the savings in crew costs.9 In particular, this refers to crew wages, 
food and other ancillary expenses. 
According to the United States Department of Transportation, crew costs 
take up about 68% of total operating costs on U.S. flagged vessels and 35% on 
foreign-flagged vessels.10 Saving such significant costs would be hugely wel-
comed by shipowners. Although an unmanned vessel would require a shore-
based operator (“SBO“) on land in a shore control centre, fewer operators would 
be required and their wages are estimated to be lower than for seafarers who 
would be compelled to experience the maritime adventure of the seas and leave 
their families for several months.
Cost savings will also be made in terms of the build and construction of 
the ship. This is attributable to the fact that there would be no need for struc-
tures for accommodation and the deckhouse11 and this will save on costs, 
weight, and space, thereby increasing cargo-carrying capacity.12 The removal 
of accommodation would lead to lighter vessels, resulting in a decrease in 
fuel consumption.13
Another benefit of the autonomous or unmanned vessel is its possible effect 
on emissions. In April 2018, the IMO Marine Environment Protection Commit-
tee (MEPC) adopted an initial strategy for reducing the total annual greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions from shipping by at least 50% by 2050. A reduction of 
GHG emissions could be achieved with the advent of unmanned vessels.  Emis-
sions from ships are closely linked to the energy requirements of a vessel.14 The 
energy which a ship uses during propulsion depends on several factors, includ-
ing ship resistance and the efficiency of the propulsion train. Ship resistance is 
affected by its shape, speed and draught. It is also affected by environmental 
9 Deketelaere, Pol, The Legal Challenges of Unmanned Vessels (Universitiet Gent, 2017). 
10 United States Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, Comparison of 
U.S. and Foreign-Flag Operating Costs, (2011).
11 Pritchett, Paul W., Ghost Ships: Why the Law Should Embrace Unmanned Vessel Technol-
ogy, (2015) 40(1) Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 197. 
12 Carey, Lucy, All Hands Off Deck? The Legal Barriers to Autonomous Ships, (2017) SSRN 
Electronic Journal. 
13 Pritchett, Ghost Ships: Why the Law Should Embrace Unmanned Vessel Technology, op. cit. 
14 Vartdal, Bjørn Johan; Skjong, Rolf; Lera St. Clair, Asun, Group Technology and Research 
Position Paper 2018, Remote Controlled and Autonomous Ships in the Maritime Industry 
(DNV GL, 2018).
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factors, such as wind, waves and current. Although there is no direct connection 
between the level of manning a ship and the speed of the ship, the level of man-
ning may be an incentive to reduce the speed of a ship. It has been suggested 
that a ship speed of 6 knots be adopted for an unmanned container ship.15 If this 
were applied, two unmanned ships operating at 6 knots would use about fifty 
percent less energy than one ship operating at 12 knots. This theory would be 
difficult to adopt in manned ships because of the increased operation costs asso-
ciated with crew members, feeding the crew and other expenses associated with 
transportation at sea with a manned vessel.
The impact of unmanned ships on safety is likely to be another driver behind 
the transition to unmanned vessels. Most marine accidents can be attributed to 
human error.16 A study estimates that between 75% and 96% of maritime acci-
dents are the direct result of human error.17 The above study further states that 
“fatigue, inadequate communication, and inadequate technical knowledge” are 
the three biggest factors contributing to human error.18 Unmanned ships have 
the potential to reduce human errors. This reason might have been a major fac-
tor in the industry taking great interest in the increasing automation of vessels.
Notwithstanding all the above-mentioned benefits of autonomous/un-
manned vessels, they are not without obstacles and challenges. 
One major challenge that unmanned vessels would pose to society is the 
number of jobs that may be lost as a result of this innovation. The United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) states that the interna-
tional shipping industry employs about 1,545,000 seafarers and global demand 
for seafarers is still increasing.19 In the event that unmanned shipping finally 
takes over our oceans, jobs would be lost. Although other jobs would be cre-
ated, such as those for information technology engineers, maintenance crew and 
shore-based operators, it is unlikely that the number would match the current 
number of employed seafarers. There have been contrary points of view on the 
15 Tvete, Hans Anton, Unmanned Vessels – THE DNV GL “REVOLT” Project (2015), https://
iumi.com/images/Berlin2015/3Pressies/1609_HansAntonTvete.pdf, (accessed on 6 March 
2019).
16 Chwedczuk, Michal, Analysis of the Legal Status of Unmanned Commercial Vessels in 
U.S. Admiralty and Maritime Law, (2016) 47(2) Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 123, 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1793648292.
17 Rothblum, Anita M., Human Error and Marine Safety, http://bowles-langley.com/wp-con-
tent/files_mf/humanerrorandmarinesafety26.pdf, (accessed on 7 March 2019).
18 Ibid.
19 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2016, 
(2016).
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issue of the loss of jobs. According to a study prepared by the Hamburg School 
of Business Administration on behalf of the ICS:20
“Few vessels will be entirely autonomous in the next decade or two. With an 
overall increase of the world fleet, at least the number of officers on board 
will remain stable. At the same time the number of ‘crew’ on shore in sup-
porting functions will increase, possibly significantly”.
The study concluded that there would be no shortage of jobs for seafarers 
in the near future. Despite this study, the general belief is that unmanned ships 
will lead to a loss of jobs.
There are also the technical obstacles facing unmanned vessels. For a ship to 
be safely navigated, the danger to safe navigation must be detected in a timely 
manner. Nevertheless, the current literature shows that the technological tools 
in autonomous vessels surpass standard crew capabilities and that autonomous 
vessels will be as safe as modern crewed vessels.21 However, elements that could 
affect safe navigation and consequently have an impact on manoeuvrability 
range from bathymetry, geography and objects which may be fixed or floating.22 
For example, detections are currently ascertained by the combined use of peo-
ple, sensors and a priori information. However, to replace the crew, sensors must 
be capable of replacing the senses of crew members on board ship. Sensor tech-
nology can do this without major problems in fair weather conditions, but when 
the weather is sultry and harsh, such as in fog, heavy seas or snowfall, there 
might be a challenge.23 Wei et al24 propose light detection and ranging and cam-
era detection fusion in a real-time industrial multi-sensor collision avoidance 
system. However, Felski et al25 argue that such a solution can be used only on 
relatively short distances, for land mobile robots. Whatever the solution to such 
navigational threats, one important aspect is the need to develop countermea-
20 Hamburg School of Business Administration, Seafarers and Digital Disruption – The Ef-
fect of Autonomous Ships on the Work at Sea, the Role of Seafarers and the Shipping 
Industry (October 2018). 
21 Felski, Andrzej; Zwolak, Karolina, The Ocean-Going Autonomous Ship—Challenges and 
Threats, (2020) 8(1) Journal of Marine Science and Engineering, 41, https://doaj.org/article/57
280f68e8d6419192a7f6e73c3975bb.
22 Vartdal, Skjong and Lera St. Clair, Group Technology and Research Position Paper 2018, 
Remote Controlled and Autonomous Ships in the Maritime Industry, op. cit.
23 Ibid.
24 Wei, Pan and others, LiDAR and Camera Detection Fusion in a Real-Time Industrial 
Multi-Sensor Collision Avoidance System, (2018) 7(6) Electronics, 84, https://search.pro-
quest.com/docview/2125335660. 
25 Felski and Zwolak, The Ocean-Going Autonomous Ship—Challenges and Threats, op. cit. 
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sure technologies. The current system in unmanned vessels must be improved 
in the case of autonomous vessels to such a degree that the operator can be very 
confident that critical subsystems will not fail during a sea voyage.26
There is also the complex situation where autonomous vessels are faced by 
a manned vessel. Whilst the autonomous ship will always behave according to 
an algorithm (barring any malfunction of its components), the behaviour of peo-
ple is not predictable. Ignorance of the rules may also affect human decision on 
board.
Another downside of the autonomous vessel is that it may increase cargo 
claims. The existing position is that the master and first officer supervise cargo 
loading and stowing. For the crew, the appropriate loading and stowing of a 
vessel could be essential to its stability and, as such, serves as a personal in-
centive to ensure the correct loading and stowing of the cargo.27 This incentive 
would not relate to shore-based operators to whom the task would most likely 
be given.
Another issue in relation to the autonomous or unmanned vessel is the laten-
cy of the teleoperation system. Latency is the period of time it takes for a signal, 
expressed by the operator, to reach the vessel via satellites or other means.28 If 
the latency becomes too long, this could jeopardise the safe and efficient opera-
tion of the vessel. Infiltration of cyber security could also cause the latency pe-
riod to increase and consequently to jeopardise the safe and efficient operation 
of the vessel.
MUNIN also states that unmanned ships would be less vulnerable to pirate 
attacks. This assertion may be partly true in relation to the traditional kind of 
piracy that now occurs, i.e. the physical hijacking of a vessel for a ransom. How-
ever, it would be naïve to think that there would be no “pirates and terrorists“ 
involved in the operation of unmanned vessels. The advent of unmanned ships 
may introduce a new kind of piracy where cyber attacks would allow hacker-pi-
rates to illegally take over the remote-control system of the vessel for the purpose 
of stealing the cargo and/or kidnapping the ship for ransom. Therefore, the ICT 
systems of vessels will require a higher level of security than they have today to 
withstand these cyber attacks which may be attempted via ICT infrastructures. 
26 Rødseth, Ørnulf Jan; Burmeister, Hans-Christoph, Developments Toward the Unmanned 
Ship, International Symposium “Information on Ships“ (August 2012). 
27 Rolls Royce, Autonomous Ships – The Next Step, https://www.rolls-royce.com/~/media/
Files/R/Rolls-Royce/documents/customers/marine/ship-intel/rr-ship-intel-aawa-8pg.pdf, 
(accessed on 8 March 2019).
28 Deketelaere, The Legal Challenges of Unmanned Vessels, op. cit.
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Some stakeholders have argued that pirates may even think that these new ships 
would be softer targets, and would bring new players to the scene.29 However, 
whether the hacker of ICT systems will be said to be a pirate within the meaning 
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is still to be seen.30 The maritime 
sector is not unfamiliar with cyber attacks. In 2017, Maersk was affected by Not-
Petya ransomware, resulting in the shutdown of its systems and costing it about 
USD 300 million. 
Despite the challenges identified above, the autonomous vessel is an innova-
tion that is here to stay. Although there are many unanswered questions con-
nected to the efficiency of unmanned vessels, their technical abilities, public ac-
ceptance, and insurable risks which need to be resolved over time, another nag-
ging question remains: can existing maritime law and policy be applied? Would 
maritime law need to undergo a rigorous revamp and amendment?
3. THE EXISTING FR AMEWOR K: PER FECT, TO BE ADAPTED, OR 
ARE ADDITIONAL LAWS NEEDED?   
3.1. Defining a Ship 
Ships have been defined by several international conventions. However, be-
fore a discussion on the applicability of maritime law can be delved into, it is 
pertinent to discover if a craft without a crew, i.e. an unmanned ship, can be said 
to be a ship. 
It is difficult to agree on a uniform definition of a ship. Gahlen states that 
there are certain characteristics inherent in a vessel. These characteristics are 
floatability; capacity for controlled movement on water; capacity for the carriage 
of goods and persons beyond its mass; and engagement in maritime naviga-
tion.31 Bork notes, in addition to the above features, that such a craft must not be 
of an insignificant size.32
29 Aro, Tommi; Heiskari, Lauri, Challenges of Unmanned Vessels: Technical Risks and Legal 
Problems (Yrkeshögskolan Novia 2018).
30 Hooydonk van, Eric, The Law of Unmanned Merchant Shipping – An Exploration, (2014) 
20(6) The Journal of International Maritime Law, 403, https://www.openaire.eu/search/publi-
cation?articleId=od_______232::423b7ca7d8565eea1b6623acea871a87.                                 
31 Gahlen, Sarah Fiona, Ships Revisited: A Comparative Study, (2014) 20(4) The Journal of 
International Maritime Law, 252.
32 Bork, Katharina and others, The Legal Regulation of Floats and Gliders—In Quest of a 
New Regime? (2008) 39(3) Ocean Development & International Law, 298, http://www.tand-
fonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00908320802235338. 
84
D. Osinuga, Unmanned ships: coping in the murky waters of traditional maritime law, 
PPP god. 59 (2020), 174, str. 75–105
To further complicate the position on the lack of a uniform definition, even 
international conventions do not agree on one. The UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea does not define a ship. 
The United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships33 
defines a ship as “any self-propelled sea-going vessel used in international 
seaborne trade for the transport of goods, passengers, or both, with the excep-
tion of vessels of less than 500 gross registered tons“.
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships34 
also defines a “ship“ as “a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine 
environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, 
floating craft and fixed or floating platforms“. 
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation35 (the SUA Convention) describes a ship as “a vessel of 
any type whatsoever not permanently attached to the sea-bed, including dy-
namically supported craft, submersibles, or any other floating craft“.
The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions 
at Sea (COLREGS) provides that a “vessel“ is “every description of water craft, 
including non-displacement craft, WIG craft and seaplanes, used or capable of 
being used as a means of transportation on water“. 
The Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks defines a ship as 
“a seagoing vessel of any type whatsoever and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion 
vehicles, submersibles, floating craft … except when such platforms are on location 
engaged in the exploration, exploitation or production of seabed mineral resources“.
According to the International Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading36 (the Hague Rules), a “ship“ means any 
vessel used for the carriage of goods by sea“.
Despite the differences in the definitions cited above, it can be seen that there 
is no requirement(s) for a watercraft to have humans on board or to be navigated 
33 The United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, (adopted: 7 Feb-
ruary 1986) (Art 2). 
34 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 1973) as 
modified by the Protocol 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78), (adopted: 2 November 
1973; entry into force: 2 October 1983).
35 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Naviga-
tion, (adopted: 10 March 1988; entry into force: 1 March 1992) UNTS 29004.
36 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of 
Lading (The Hague Rules) (Brussels), (adopted: 25 August 1924; entry into force: 2 June 
1931).
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by humans on board for it to be seen as a ship. All definitions relied on above, 
including other definitions not explored here,37 do not consider having a crew on 
board, including a master, as an essential part of the notion of ship in the regula-
tory definitions of ship available to us.38A further look into national laws sug-
gests the same position. The UK’s 1995 Merchant Shipping Act39 provides that a 
“ship“ includes “every description of vessel used in navigation“. The Nigerian 
Merchant Shipping Act40 also defines a ship as “a vessel of any type whatsoever 
operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion 
vehicles, submersibles, floating craft, and fixed or floating platforms or mobile 
offshore units when such platforms or units are not on location engaged in the 
exploration, exploitation, storage or production of sea-bed mineral resource“.
Article 11 of the UAE Maritime Law41 defines a ship as follows:
“1. A vessel shall mean any structure normally operating, or made for the 
purpose of operating, in navigation by sea, without regard to its power, ton-
nage, or the purpose for which it sails.
2. In applying the provisions of the Law, hovercraft used for commercial or 
non-commercial purposes shall be deemed to be ships.
3. All appurtenances of the ship necessary for the operation thereof shall be 
deemed to be part of the ship and of the same nature“.
It is interesting to note that there are no international conventions or national 
laws that make the presence of a crew a criterion for a watercraft or a structure 
to be a ship. Many scholars agree that for the purposes of the Law of the Sea 
unmanned vessels must be regarded as ships.42 There is a strong argument for 
unmanned ships to be considered “ships” so that they may be integrated into 
37 See definitions of ships under the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime 
Claims (LLMC), (adopted: 19 November 1976; entry into force: 1 December 1986); Con-
vention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COL-
REGS), (adopted: 20 October 1972; entry into force: 15 July 1977) (Rule 3); Convention on 
the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, (adopted: 29 
December 1972 as amended; entry into force: 30 August 1975); International Convention 
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC),(adopted: 29 November 1969; entry into 
force: 19 June 1975). 
38 Hooydonk, The law of Unmanned Merchant Shipping – An Exploration, op. cit.
39 United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act 1995, Section 313.
40 Nigerian Merchant Shipping Act 1995, Section 361.
41 The UAE Federal Law No. 26 of 1981 on Maritime Commercial Law, as amended. 
42 Henderson, Andrew H., Murky Waters: The Legal Status of Unmanned Undersea Vehi-
cles, (2006) 53 Naval Law Review, 55; Kraska, James, The Law of Unmanned Naval Systems 
in War and Peace, (2010) 5(3) The Journal of Ocean Technology, 44. 
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existing legal frameworks because their operations will pose many of the same 
collision and pollution risks as manned vessels.43
Although the definitions of ships may differ in different statutes and conven-
tions given that the legal definitions are tilted in line with the subject matter of 
the laws or convention, it is very clear that human presence is never one of the 
conditions for a structure to be defined as a ship. More importantly, the lack of 
a uniform definition can be a “blessing in disguise“, affording flexibility to the 
definition of ships.44
Against this background, despite the lack of uniformity on the definition of 
a ship, it is easy to see that the definitions of ships under international conven-
tions and national laws are broad enough to admit the unmanned ship as a ship 
within these contexts. States will be able to admit the unmanned vessel consider-
ing that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)45 does 
not define a ship and Article 91 stipulates that a State has the powers to grant a 
ship the power to fly its flag, consequently leaving the State to determine what 
a ship is. 
3.2. Genuine Link to a Flag State?
The nationality of a ship as distinct from the nationality of its owner is said 
to have emerged as a matter of State practice at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.46 Registration of a ship is necessary as a matter of practice because a 
vessel or its owner may need the assistance or intervention of the flag State.47 For 
a vessel to hoist a flag, there must exist a genuine link between the State and the 
flag as stipulated by UNCLOS and the United Nations Convention on Condi-
tions for Registration of Ships.48 UNCLOS requires that every State assume juris-
diction under its domestic laws over each ship flying its flag, its master, officers 
and crew in respect of administrative, technical and social matters concerning 
43 CMI IWG. CMI International Working Group Position Paper on Unmanned Ships and the 
International Regulatory Framework, op. cit.
44 Veal, Robert; Tsimplis, Michael, the Integration of Unmanned Ships into the Lex Maritima, 
(2017) (2) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, 303. 
45 Adopted: 10 December 1982; entry into force: 16 November 1994.
46 Cogliati-Bantz, Vincent P., Means of Transportation and Registration of Nationality, (2015).
47 Kontorovich, Eugene, Arctic Sunrise (Netherlands v. Russia); In re Arctic Sunrise (Nether-
lands v. Russia), (2016) 110(1) The American Journal of International Law, 96.
48 Article 91 UNCLOS. 
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the ship.49Article 94 UNCLOS states the duties of the flag State. More particu-
larly, Article 94(3) UNCLOS states that:  
“Every State shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as are necessary 
to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to:
a) the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships; 
b) the manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of crews, taking 
into account the applicable international instruments;
c) the use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention 
of collisions“. 
Article 94(4)(b) & (c) UNCLOS states that:
“Such measures shall include those necessary to ensure:
b) that each ship is in the charge of a master and officers who possess appro-
priate qualifications, in particular in seamanship, navigation, communica-
tions and marine engineering, and that the crew is appropriate in qualifica-
tion and numbers for the type, size, machinery and equipment of the ship;
c) that the master, officers and, to the extent appropriate, the crew are fully 
conversant with and required to observe the applicable international regu-
lations concerning the safety of life at sea, the prevention of collisions, the 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution, and the maintenance 
of communications by radio“.
Looking at the above provisions, each flag State bears the duty of providing 
the necessary conditions to be fulfilled by the ship flying its flag in respect of 
manning, labour conditions and the training of crews. Article 94(4)(b) UNCLOS 
further states that each ship is in the charge of a master and officers who pos-
sess appropriate qualifications, and that the crew is appropriate in qualification 
and numbers for the type of ship. The position will, however, be different in 
unmanned vessels. The intention behind this provision is to ensure that there 
is safety at sea. In particular, Article 94(3) UNCLOS uses the word “inter alia“. 
The implication is that the measures to be taken are not exhaustive and a State 
may determine the relevant measures to help it guarantee safety at sea for ships 
hoisting its flag. Against this backdrop, once it can be ascertained by a flag State 
that an unmanned vessel does not require the listed measures to ensure safety, 
the said provision can be rendered redundant and inapplicable by flag States in 
relation to unmanned vessels.
49 Article 94(2)(b) UNCLOS.
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Article 94(4)(b) & (c) stipulates that a flag State must ensure that each ship is 
in the charge of a master. In the case of an unmanned vessel, the ship will not be 
in the charge of a traditional master since humans are not on board. However, 
some commentators argue that the SBO who controls the navigation of the ves-
sel ashore should be seen as the master for the purpose of this provision. In line 
with such a view, flag States will ensure that the SBO fulfils the requirements set 
out in UNCLOS. As effective as this may seem, the challenge of this application 
is that the task of a shore-based vessel controller is not entirely similar to that 
of a ship’s master.50 There is something called “Captain’s Law“, which covers a 
whole spectrum of rules that determine the legal status of a master.51
Against this backdrop, in the case of an unmanned vessel with no human 
on board, the legal powers exercised by the master will cease. Traditionally, 
the master is the person on board who is responsible for the nautical command 
of the ship, or, in the case of an emergency, performs legal acts on behalf of 
the owners, or exercises the employer’s authority over a community of workers 
temporarily isolated from society. All these responsibilities are rather different 
from those that an SBO will possibly hold in the future.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that an SBO will require qualifications in sea-
manship, navigation, communications and marine engineering to operate a ves-
sel from shore. As such, the provision may be inapplicable in the case of an 
unmanned vessel. Accordingly, the general assumption that an SBO is a ship’s 
master in respect of this provision may lead to absurdity. Considering that 
States have the duty to implement this provision of UNCLOS, it is accordingly 
suggested that States put in place measures to ensure safety and to regularly 
update the relevant qualification of shore-based operators. 
With respect to determining a genuine link to a flag State, criteria are re-
duced particularly in relation to open registries or flags of convenience. The 
United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships52 is most 
likely never going to enter into force and so uniformity on a genuine link is dif-
ficult to foresee. 
Currently, a genuine link is created if a ship is owned by nationals of the State 
which exercises control over the ship, is manned by nationals of that State, and 
50 Hooydonk, The Law of Unmanned Merchant Shipping – An Exploration, op. cit.
51 Aro and Heiskari, Challenges of Unmanned Vessels: Technical Risks and Legal Problems, 
op. cit.
52 The United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, Geneva, (ad-
opted: 7 February 1986).
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frequently stops in the ports of that State.53 According to Hooydonk, a genuine 
link may be illusionary in respect of unmanned shipping, particularly in an era 
where the “…owner of the unmanned ship is not necessarily established in that 
state, when the ship never calls in the ports of that state and when it is controlled 
and monitored by an anonymous operator sitting at a control desk somewhere 
in a distant low-cost country, or by a computer program created in one or other 
country and operating ‘in the cloud’? Instead of being genuine, the link would 
then be virtual in the highest degree“.54
It is true that UNCLOS does not define a genuine link, and an extremely 
slender relationship between the flag State and a fictitious legal person not nec-
essarily based in the flag State with an address would be sufficient to serve as a 
genuine link. Despite the desirability of the normative insistence of a real link 
between a vessel and the flag State, the International Tribunal on the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS) has stated that the need for the genuine link requirement in Article 
91 UNCLOS is “to secure more effective implementation of the duties of the flag 
State, and not to establish criteria by reference to which the validity of the regis-
tration of ships of a flag State may be challenged by other States“.55
The concept in respect of an unmanned vessel may be simply idealistic be-
cause the genuine link between the owner of an unmanned ship and the flag 
ship is difficult to find. The owner of an unmanned ship is not necessarily domi-
ciled in that State, the ship never calls at the State and the SBO is operating from 
a low-cost nation or even by a computer program in the case of a fully auto-
mated vessel. Whilst it is common knowledge that shipping holds on to very old 
traditions, the whole concept of a genuine link might be unnecessary in the era 
of unmanned shipping. 
Further, States have discretion to lay down guidelines that a ship needs to 
comply with to be able to show a genuine link between the State, the ship and 
the owners.56 It is up to the States to indicate to their own maritime administra-
tion authorities what a genuine link is. It is therefore submitted that creating a 
genuine link for an unmanned ship will not pose a problem under the existing 
framework.
53 Shaughnessy, Tina; Tobin, Ellen, Flags of Inconvenience: Freedom and Insecurity on the 
High Seas, (2006) Journal of International Law & Policy, https://www.law.upenn.edu/jour-
nals/jil/jilp/articles/1-1_Shaughnessy_Tina.pdf. 
54 Hooydonk, The Law of Unmanned Merchant Shipping – An Exploration, op. cit.
55 Churchill, Robin R.; Hedley, Christopher, The Meaning of the “Genuine Link” Requirement 
in Relation to the Nationality of Ships (International Transport Workers’ Federation 2000).
56 Ibid.
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3.3. Complying with Different Conventions in Relation to Safety, Manning 
and Qualifications
Most international conventions relating to shipping envisage conventional 
manned ships. The IMO Principles of Safe Manning is the primary international 
standard on safe maning. The principles are non-binding guidance on how to 
set minimum safe manning requirements for vessels. A safe manning level is 
therefore subjective,57 and each flag State may decide on the minimum man-
ning it prefers to adopt. In the United Kingdom, a ship owner is to submit to the 
Secretary of State its proposal for safe manning numbers according to the type 
of vessel and nature of the voyage. This means that an owner of an autonomous 
ship may submit that a safe manning number is zero. A contrary position is held 
by Nigeria where the Merchant Shipping (manning) Regulation 2010 stipulates 
the minimum manning for each vessel. In jurisdictions where there are statutory 
safe manning principles, such countries can amend or may simply adopt a posi-
tion similar to that of the United Kingdom.
Another convention that partly regulates manning is the 1974 International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). Paragraph 1 of Annex 2 of the 
SOLAS Convention states that “Every ship to which chapter I of the Conven-
tion applies shall be provided with an appropriate safe manning document or 
equivalent issued by the Administration as evidence of the minimum safe man-
ning“. This implies that SOLAS envisages traditional ships as being manned 
and, as such, for a vessel to be SOLAS compliant, it will have to have appropriate 
manning documents. 
SOLAS also requires that survival craft be available on board and a suffi-
cient number of crew members must also be aboard the vessel to operate it.58 
Clearly, the rationale behind this is that conventional ships are always manned 
and, consequently, an avenue for escape in the case of emergency must be made 
available. Considering that there would be no need for crew to escape on un-
manned vessels, this regulation is not important and unmanned vessels may be 
exempted.59
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) is a convention that regulates and sets min-
imum qualification standards for seafarers. Its purpose is to promote the safety 
of life and property at sea and to protect the marine environment by establishing 
57 See Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisah [1962] 2 WLR 474.
58 Part B – Requirements for ships and life-saving appliances, Regulation 10.
59 Pritchett, Ghost Ships: Why the Law Should Embrace Unmanned Vessel Technology, op. cit.
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an international agreement on the standards of training, certification and watch-
keeping for seafarers. The STCW Convention applies to all seafarers on board sea-
going vessels, except for seafarers working on military ships, state-owned ships 
and non-commercial governmental ships.60 Whilst the STCW Convention does 
not define a seafarer, the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 defines a “seafarer“ 
as “any person who is employed or engaged or works in any capacity on board 
a ship to which this Convention applies“. A combined reading of both conven-
tions would mean that the STCW Convention applies to persons employed or 
engaged to work on a ship. 
Among other things, STCW chapter VIII provides for watchkeeping ar-
rangements. More importantly, Regulation VIII/2 uses the phrase “physically 
present“.61 It is easy to see that the relevant manning conventions which were 
made to promote the safety of life and property at sea cannot directly be adapted 
to a person operating a vessel ashore. Accordingly, there might be a need to 
amend the manning conventions or for a protocol on autonomous vessels. 
3.4. Does It Obliterate Piracy?
The menace of piracy has always been a concern for maritime stakeholders 
and other industry players. Although the menace of piracy seems to have de-
clined in the last few years, the crime continues to put people lives and econo-
mies at risk.62 Article 101 UNCLOS provides that:
“Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, com-
mitted for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a 
private aircraft, and directed:
i. on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft;
ii. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the juris-
diction of any State;
60 See Article III of the STCW Convention.
61 Vartdal, Skjong and Lera St. Clair, Group Technology and Research Position Paper 2018, 
Remote Controlled and Autonomous Ships in the Maritime Industry, op. cit. 
62 Satkauskas, Rytis, Piracy at Sea and the Limits of International Law, (2011) 1(2) Aegean 
Review of the Law of the Sea and Maritime Law, 217.
92
D. Osinuga, Unmanned ships: coping in the murky waters of traditional maritime law, 
PPP god. 59 (2020), 174, str. 75–105
b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an air-
craft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-
paragraph (a) or (b)“.
The above provisions stipulate that any illegal acts of violence or detention, 
or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the pas-
sengers of a private ship or a private aircraft on the high seas against another 
ship or aircraft will amount to piracy. A closer review of the UNCLOS regime 
shows that for an action to be considered piracy, it must include violence or 
detention.
An unmanned vessel would most likely not be susceptible to traditional 
maritime piracy. An unmanned vessel may, however, be hijacked by “cyber 
pirates”. The question is whether taking control of an unmanned vessel by 
exploiting weaknesses in its electronic information systems would be consid-
ered violent. The United States courts have noted that acts of “violence” do not 
have to be directed at a person: malicious acts against inanimate objects also 
comport with the commonsense understanding of the term.63 Accordingly, an 
unauthorised person who hijacks a vessel even by electronic means may fall 
under the description of being violent. 
The use of the word “or” in the definition of piracy provides that an alter-
native to the condition of violence is detention. A look at the definition shows 
that it is possible for a cyber hijacking to be an illegal act of detention.64 Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines detention as the “custody of property”. It is arguable 
that the hijacking of an unmanned vessel will be an illegal act of detention. The 
hijacker will most likely be able to navigate the vessel to anywhere he desires 
and control the vessel during the period the vessel is hijacked.
Finally, an important issue is whether detention must be committed by 
crew members or a passenger of a private ship or aircraft. A literal reading of 
this feature of an act of piracy shows that piracy of a ship can only be commit-
ted by people who are physically aboard a ship.65 A cyber pirate would most 
likely be ashore and may not fall within the traditional meaning of piracy, thus 
making  UNCLOS not a perfect regulation for an unmanned vessel in relation 
to piracy.
63 Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, 725 F3d 940, 944, 2013 
AMC 1695, 1698 (9th Cir. 2013).
64 Pritchett, Ghost Ships: Why the Law Should Embrace Unmanned Vessel Technology, op. cit.
65 Ibid.
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In light of this, it is suggested that UNCLOS be expanded to assimilate and 
absorb the variants of piracy which may extend to cyber pirates. In addition, 
because of the difficulty that comes with amending conventions, States can ex-
pand domestic laws to cover the intrinsic characteristics of what cyber piracy 
may look like.
3.5. COLREGS
The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions 
at Sea, 1972 (COLREGS), is the primary international instrument with respect to 
the prevention of collisions at sea and navigational rules. The COLREGS Con-
vention is an attempt to make navigation safer by establishing common naviga-
tional behavioural patterns and standardising certain equipment on vessels.66 
Rule 2 COLREGS stipulates that nothing in COLREGS “shall exonerate any ves-
sel, or the owner, master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect 
to comply with these Rules or of the neglect of any precaution which may be 
required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of 
the case”.
Rule 5 COLREGS states that “Every vessel shall at all times maintain a prop-
er look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate 
in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of 
the situation and of the risk of collision”.
By the above rules, it appears that it is expected that a crew would be on 
board always to ensure that the requirement of a lookout by sight and hearing 
is met. However, there are arguments that this can be satisfied with the use of 
audio-visual technology given that courts have recognised the use of informa-
tion from a shore-based radar facility in the Nordic Ferry case,67 and the use of 
radar as an appropriate means.68 It is nonetheless important for the SBO to be in 
a position to respond appropriately in complex and changing situations69.
Accordingly, unless an autonomous ship can satisfy the requirement of Rule 
5 and react to potential collisions with at least the same level of skill and intui-
tion as an experienced mariner, COLREGS may need to be amended to allow 
autonomous ships to operate legally.
66 Ibid.
67 [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 591.
68 See Maritime Harmony 13  [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 400 and the Roseline 17 [1981] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 410. 
69 Carey, All Hands Off Deck? The Legal Barriers to Autonomous Ships, op. cit.
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Again, in relation to collision, the 1910 Collision Convention adopts a fault-
based regime envisaging liability. Many issues may arise in relation to comply-
ing with the 1910 Convention. Ascertaining who is at fault in the case of an 
unmanned vessel might pose a problem. Can artificial intelligence be “at fault” 
and therefore to blame? Would the position be different if there were a colli-
sion between a manned ship and an unmanned ship? On the presumption that 
computers do not make errors, will the manned vessel alone be to blame? Bear-
ing in mind that a ship as an object cannot be at fault, is it necessary to extend 
the circle of persons to be held liable for the actions of an unmanned ship to the 
manufacturer of the systems70 or the operators? Should a regime of strict liability 
be introduced?71
Soyer72 suggests that a strict liability regime be adopted for autonomous re-
gimes. Of course, the use of strict liability regimes is not new to international 
conventions.73 The justification for this is that in building an autonomous vessel, 
the number of individuals involved is likely to be enormous. The courts will 
then be dealing with apportioning liability between hardware manufacturers, 
sensor programmers, software developers and other relevant persons. This will 
be time consuming and may be unfair to the third-party claimant. Another jus-
tification for a strict liability regime is that, over the years, intelligent machines 
adapt to the instructions they receive from humans which were not used at the 
time of their creation. If this is true, a test of fault-based liability may be impos-
sible in a situation where an autonomous vessel has adapted to the subsequent 
instructions received through its operation, and where those instructions are 
different from those originally programmed into the vessel. 
Soyer74 also suggests that there should be exceptions to the strict liability re-
gime. For example, if an autonomous vessel is involved in a collision when it is 
not under operation, a strict liability regime should not be applied because the 
action of the vessel did not create a risk of navigation. Soyer further argues that 
70 Volvo’s CEO announced that it will accept full liability if any of its cars crash while in full 
autonomous driving mode.
71 Howse, Tim, Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships – Identifying and Covering the Risks, 
(2019), http://www.gard.no/web/updates/content/27188643/maritime-autonomous-surface-
ships-identifying-and-covering-the-risks, (accessed on 21 March 2019).
72 Soyer, Barış, Autonomous Vessels and Third-Party Liabilities, in Soyer, Barış; Tettenborn , 
Andrew (eds.), New Technologies, Artificial Intelligence and Shipping Law in the 21st Century 
(1st edn, Routledge 2020), 105..
73 Article 3 of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
(CLC), (adopted: 27 November 1992; entry into force: 30 May 1996).
74 Soyer, Autonomous Vessels and Third-Party Liabilities, op. cit.
95
D. Osinuga, Unmanned ships: coping in the murky waters of traditional maritime law, 
PPP god. 59 (2020), 174, str. 75–105
where the vessel is in the charge of an operator, a fault-based system be used 
in apportioning liability. To further complicate the liability issue of collision, 
where a cyber attack leads to collision, who should bear liability? It is suggested 
that it is only fair that liability is taken by the shipowner who put an autono-
mous vessel at sea knowing that once there is an attack, it is difficult for shore-
based controllers to intervene.
Even when a strict liability regime is put in place, the question arises as to 
who is liable, the manufacturer or the shipowner? It is quite appealing to say 
the manufacturer of the software should be liable for a collision considering that 
he understands every detail of the software and should be responsible for loss 
attributable to a breakdown of software. However, it is more pragmatic to claim 
that the shipowner be held responsible because: (1) it is an age-long maritime 
principle that anyone who engages in hazardous activity should be held respon-
sible; (2) a shipowner is expected to maintain and inspect the software after the 
vessel has been delivered; (3) the P&I clubs have cover extending to shipowners 
which would ensure that the 3rd party is duly indemnified for loss as a result of 
a collision. 
Accordingly, the importance of safety cannot be over emphasised. It is there-
fore crucial that the issue of compliance with COLREGS by unmanned vessels 
be resolved. This may be by creating a new set of seaway rules for these vessels. 
Such rules will take into consideration the traffic regulation between unmanned 
ships and manned ships. They will also take into account ethical dilemmas con-
nected with unmanned ships.75 Such rules will form part of the international 
regulation and revision of seaway. Indeed, the determination of liability in colli-
sion is highly important and should be considered in detail.
3.6. Carriage of Goods by Sea
The Hague Rules76 and the Hague-Visby Rules provide that a carrier may 
be allowed complete immunity if it can be proven that the cargo losses were 
caused by a negligent act or omission relating to the navigation or management 
of the ship.77 Relating this to an unmanned vessel, when will the defence be ap-
plicable? It has been argued by some scholars that if the SBO is negligent, the 
75 CORE Advokatfirma and Cefor, Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships – Zooming in on Civil 
Liability and Insurance (Cefor, December 2018).
76 The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills 
of Lading.
77 Article 4(2) of the Hague Rules.
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shipowner will be able to rely on the provisions of Article 4(2) of the Hague 
(Visby) Rules and escape liability.78 This argument may seem to resolve the issue 
in instances where the vessels are remote controlled but, considering that the 
level of automation of unmanned ships will differ, the same cannot be said in 
instances where the vessel is fully automated and needs no shore-based control-
ler. Such an interpretation will be impracticable, unworkable, and the provisions 
redundant.
It may be possible to argue that where cargo losses are caused by a technical 
fault which is attributable to the manufacturers and technology providers, such li-
ability will fall on the product manufacturers which have caused the loss. Wheth-
er the manufacturers would be prepared to accept liability remains to be seen.
The Hague Rules require the carrier “to exercise due diligence to make the 
ship seaworthy” before a voyage. A seaworthy vessel is one that is “reasonably 
fit to carry the cargo which she has undertaken to transport”. Vessels will be said 
to be unseaworthy where they have been found unseaworthy for sailing due 
to incorrect charts,79 insufficient bunkers for the voyage,80 the absence of docu-
ments required to satisfactorily prosecute the contemplated voyage,81 defective 
navigational equipment,82 and “having unqualified crew members”.83
Findings of unseaworthiness under these standards in the context of remote-
ly operated and fully autonomous USVs are not difficult to imagine. However, 
in relation to crew members, it is arguable that for vessels with SBOs, the SBO 
would be the crew in such instances, and, where the SBO is incompetent, the ship 
would be unseaworthy and the shipowner would be liable. The unanswered 
question in this context is what will be used to determine the SBO’s competence. 
The Advanced Autonomous Waterborne Applications Initiative (AAWA) 
opines that Shore-Based Operators will be master mariners with years of seago-
ing experience.84 If this is the case, in decades to come shore-based operators 
78 Rodriguez-Delgado, Juan Pablo, The Legal Challenges of Unmanned Ships in the Private 
Maritime Law: What Laws Would You Change?, (2018) SSRN Electronic Journal.
79 The Marion [1984] AC325.
80 McFadden v Blue Star Line [1905] 1 KB 697, at p. 704.
81 The Madeleine [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 224.
82 Complaint of Thebes Shipping Inc., 486 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
83 Hong Kong Fir Shipping v KKK [1962] 2 QB 26 (see also The Eurasian Dream [2002] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 719).
84 Advanced Autonomous Waterborne Applications Initiative (AAWA) Remote and Autono-
mous Ship – The Next Steps, 70 https://www.utu.fi/en/units/law/research/research-proj-
ects/Pages/aawa.aspx, (accessed on 24 March 2019).
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who meet such a requirement will be difficult to find because, as more ships 
become automated, fewer people will be going to sea.85
3.7. Cyber Security and Insurance
The advent of the internet and its increased use has significantly increased 
the vulnerability of organisations to information theft, identity theft, disclosure 
of sensitive information, vandalism, business interruption and denial-of-service 
attacks, thereby bringing information security issues to the top of the agenda for 
corporate executives.86A cyber attack could also result in unquantifiable repu-
tational damage and erosion of trust, which would have dire economic conse-
quences.
Risks associated with data exchange are prevalent in all sectors. However, 
with the introduction of unmanned vessels, it is expected that exposure to cyber 
risk will increase. Cyber risk is defined as “operational risks to information and 
technology assets that have consequences affecting the confidentiality, availabil-
ity, or integrity of information or information systems”.87 Safety continues to be 
an important issue in maritime navigation and, as such, maritime stakeholders 
are worried about cyber security. Stakeholders including the IMO are focusing 
on identifying risk mitigation instruments, optimising internal procedures and 
anchoring cyber resilience in top-level management.88
In relation to unmanned vessels, crimes such as cyber piracy89 could become 
a trend. It is therefore important for regulations to be adopted to ensure that 
cyber security is good enough to reduce the possibility of cyber crime with the 
advent of unmanned ships. However, cyber security is not just about preventing 
hackers gaining access to systems and information, potentially resulting in the 
loss of confidentiality and/or control. It also addresses the maintenance of integ-
rity and the availability of information and systems, ensuring business continu-
ity and the continuing utility of digital assets and systems. It is thus important 
that adequate attention is given not only to protecting ship systems from attack 
85 Carey, All Hands Off Deck? The Legal Barriers to Autonomous Ships, op. cit.
86 Gordon, Lawrence A.; Loeb, Martin P.; Sohail, Tashfeen, A Framework for Using Insur-
ance for Cyber-Risk Management, (2003) 46(3) Communications of the ACM, 81.
87 Cebula, James J.; Young, Lisa R., A Taxonomy of Operational Cyber Security Risks (ACI 
Information Group, December 2010).
88 CORE Advokatfirma and Cefor, Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships – Zooming in on Civil 
Liability and Insurance, op. cit. 
89 The piracy which would be prevalent with unmanned shipping is different from tradi-
tional piracy. See discussion above on piracy in unmanned vessels.
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but also to ensuring the design of the systems and supporting processes is re-
silient and that appropriate reversionary modes are available in the event of a 
compromise.90
This is important because a ship is naturally connected to a large web of net-
works. Running such complex systems could be an entry point for cyber crimi-
nals to perpetrate malicious acts. Finally, particular attention must be given to 
inside threats from shore-based operators who may decide to behave malicious-
ly. Regulations on the necessary precautions to be taken by every shipowner, 
shore-based operator and other players in relation to cyber security must be 
made in view of the imminent takeover of our oceans by unmanned ships. Fail-
ure to comply with such regulation or the failure of an organisation to have 
adequate cyber risk management could make the unmanned ship unseaworthy.
Marine safety and security have been one of the main objectives of the IMO. 
The International Safety Management Code (ISM) and International Ship and 
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) are regulations to ensure safety in ship and 
harbour operations, as well as in the working environment, which includes per-
sonnel on shore and on board vessels.91 The above-mentioned codes are focal 
points in relation to risk identification, accident prevention and emergencies in 
the maritime industry.
On 5 July 2017, the IMO issued Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Manage-
ment, which provide recommendations on the protection of ships from the emerg-
ing threat of cyber attacks. According to the Guidelines, member governments 
are encouraged to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed in safety 
management systems no later than the first annual verification of the company’s 
Document of Compliance after 1 January 2021. The IMO also amended two of its 
general security management codes to explicitly include cyber security.92
Stakeholders appear to be happy with the inclusion of cyber risk manage-
ment under the ISM Code with effect from 1 January 2021 as adopted by the 
IMO. However, there is a lack of clarity about the standards that will be used to 
assess the risk management of unmanned ships. Internationally recognised non-
marine specific standards like the International Electrotechnical Commission, 
the International Organization for Standardization, and cyber risk management 
programmes, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cyber-
90 Lagouvardou, Sortiria, Maritime Cyber Security: Concepts, Problems and Models (Techni-
cal University of Denmark, 2018). 
91 Ibid.
92 The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) and International Security 
Management Code (ISM).
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security Framework, are expected to be applicable together with guidelines and 
procedures from classification societies.93 Shipowners should take a risk-based 
approach to ensuring cyber security. They have to see the nexus between strong 
cyber-security practices and the survival of their business.
3.8. Unresolved Issues
Despite discussing several issues above, this paper cannot exhaustively con-
sider all the legal aspects related to the introduction of unmanned ships. The 
issue of the definition of the word “seafarer” under the Maritime Labour Con-
vention 2006 (MLC) and whether MLC will be applied to shore-based operators 
has not been discussed. 
The issue of the pilot and the pilot’s status have also not been considered in 
this paper. Although the status of the pilot is not defined in any international 
convention, it is important that their status be determined under national laws 
in view of the introduction of unmanned vessels. Traditionally, a pilot is re-
garded as an advisor with local knowledge who assists the master on board with 
advice about navigation in the pilotage waters in the approaches to ports and in 
waterways.94
There are some places where the pilot gives advice from the shore by means 
of radio communications. In such instances, the pilot would be an advisor and 
cannot be said to be liable for negligence. However, because of the underlying 
determinative factor of efficient pilotage which depends on the effectiveness of 
the communications and information exchange between the pilot, the master 
and the bridge personnel, while the unmanned ship requires tug assistance upon 
entering and leaving ports, the question arises about who has command of the 
tow. In most jurisdictions, the law is that the master of the vessel is not relieved 
of responsibility for the conduct and navigation of the vessel only because the 
vessel is under pilotage.95 In the case of unmanned vessels, who takes respon-
sibility for the conduct of the vessel? Should this be the shore-based operators, 
who may not directly be employees of the shipowners, or the shipowners?
93 CORE Advokatfirma and Cefor, Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships – Zooming in on Civil 
Liability and Insurance, op. cit.
94 Aro and Heiskari, Challenges of Unmanned Vessels: Technical Risks and Legal Problems, op. cit.
95 For example, see Section 326 of the Australian Navigation Act 2012. 
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4. CONCLUSION
It is impracticable to transplant the existing liability rules applicable in the 
context of traditional manned maritime activity to its unmanned counterpart. 
Although SBOs may be placed side by side with conventional seafarers, there is 
a shift in the impact of responsibilities. 
Unmanned ships will rely heavily on information technology, software and 
communication systems. These vessels will have no one on board to diagnose and 
“troubleshoot“ even glitches. The role of the remote controller of an unmanned 
ship is believed to be similar to that of the master in that both assume real-time 
command of, among other things, the movement and signalling of the relevant 
ship. However, in the case of a fully automated vessel which is not controlled 
ashore, there may be complications because a pre-programmer of an autonomous 
unmanned ship enjoys a role unparalleled in the traditional maritime domain. He 
is potentially the last human input into the ship’s navigational course but, unlike 
a master, does not exercise real-time decision-making influence.96
The pre-programmer is in this sense more akin to an engineer or even a 
component manufacturer but, unlike each of these, in the context of an au-
tonomous collision avoidance system with no onboard oversight, his before-
the-event conduct potentially has a far more profound bearing on the ship’s 
navigational safety than the ordinary component manufacturer of a manned 
ship. Applying ordinary principles, liability arising from an accident involving 
a programmed autonomous unmanned ship is to be apportioned between the 
shipowner, the software manufacturer and the pre-programmer. Each of these 
could be separate or the same corporate entities, which further adds to the 
complexity. To what extent liability between these parties should be joint and 
several must be considered, as must the entitlement or otherwise of the pre-
programmer to invoke the liability limitations of the shipowner.97 New regula-
tions and practices will need to be developed to cover the activities introduced 
by unmanned operations.
The most important consideration in the regulation of unmanned cargo is 
safety. Due to the innovative technology involved, the level of safety currently 
guaranteed by cruise boats is a clear standard. It is unrealistic to expect regula-
tors or the entire maritime community to accept lower standards. Given the ad-
vent of the new technology, the most appropriate regulatory approach is to in-
96 CMI IWG. CMI International Working Group Position Paper on Unmanned Ships and the 
International Regulatory Framework, op. cit. 
97 Ibid.
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clude unmanned vessels in existing frameworks, with some significant changes 
based on the findings of the earlier pages of this work.
It is important to note that considerable amendments to the existing frame-
work are needed for the operation of pre-programmed unmanned ships. It may 
take a long time to change the established IMO rules, as an agreement between 
a small number of States alone cannot bring about international change. Interna-
tional conventions are politically difficult to achieve, especially when it comes to 
international transport. Based on the foregoing, it may be more appropriate and 
easier for these changes to be effected from a State and domestic level. 
National regulations play an important part in providing safety information 
for unmanned vessels to national authorities. The governments of these coun-
tries play a crucial role in the provision of supply as they relate to technology 
that meets international requirements. Currently, the IMO has introduced more 
than 50 international regulations and conventions. Most of the obligations im-
posed by these regulations are administered by flag States who consequently 
enforce them by national regulations that reflect internationally agreed stand-
ards. Accordingly, it is suggested that rather than the current position of having 
an international framework before having a domestic framework, stakeholders 
must now put the “horse behind the cart”. 
As far as international regulation is concerned, some problems must be 
solved before establishing an international framework for unmanned vessels. 
A more detailed review of the current legal framework is needed to assess its 
applicability to unmanned ships, as well as to determine whether unmanned 
ships can comply with the current international conventions governing mari-
time law and to what extent they need to be changed or clarified. It might also 
be important to distinguish provisions which are prescriptive and compulsory 
in nature from those which are permissive. It is expedient to identify if there is 
a need to adapt conventions and regulations, to amend conventions and regula-
tions, protocols and in some cases to adopt new regulations to ensure that there 
are no legal impediments for the use of unmanned vessels. Until then, domestic 
regulations for coastal States might just be a step in the right direction to achieve 
an international uniform framework that closes the loopholes and deals with the 
uncertainties that unmanned ships will bring to the world.
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Sažetak:
AU TONOM N I BRODOV I: SNA L A ŽE N J E U OK V I R I M A 
T R A DICIONA L NOG POMOR SKOG PR AVA
Tehnologija se razvija znatno brže nego pravo. Prilagodbu pravnih režima tehnološ-
kim unaprjeđenjima ometa komplicirana zakonodavna procedura i birokracija. Promjene 
koje u svijetu donosi tehnologija osjećaju se u pomorskoj industriji kao i u drugim indu-
strijama. U svjetlu nezaobilaznog tehnološkog razvoja, u radu se proučavaju područja 
pomorskog prava na koja djeluje otkriće autonomnih plovila i mogući putevi zaobilaženja 
prepreka u njihovom pravnom uređenju.  
Ključne riječi: pomorstvo; tehnologija; pravo; autonomni brodovi.
